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OPEN HOUSE: CONNECTED HOMES AND THE CURTILAGE 
KEYNOTE, UNC JOLT 2016 SYMPOSIUM 
 
Mary Ellen Callahan 
We have heard all morning about legal issues with the Internet 
of Things; I want to begin with acknowledging the human aspects 
and human interests in Internet-enabled homes, which are more 
visceral and personal than IoT devices monitoring other 
interactions. I have worked in privacy for almost 20 years, and I 
passionately believe we need to think carefully about the privacy 
implications that come with technology, especially when we are 
dealing with the home.  
The rapid increase of technology is re-defining our very 
concept of “home,” and that raises several crucial questions: 
1) what do we mean by “home,” 
2) why do we expect more privacy in our homes, and 
3) if that is a legitimate expectation under the current legal 
doctrine, is that expectation sustainable – or even reasonable – in a 
sensor-laden world where actions inside and outside the house are 
documented, gauged and stored? 
CURTILAGE OF THE HOME 
More than 50 years ago, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the 
right to retreat into the home lies “at the very core” of the Fourth 
Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
But the concept of “home” extends beyond the walls of our houses 
– there is an old common law and constitutional concept that 
persons have a heightened sense of privacy in, and among the 
“curtilage” of, one’s home, which is land attached to a house, 
surrounding it to “form one enclosure with it.” The curtilage is the 
area created by the actions the property owner to define a protected 
space – even if outside the house. Think of raising fences and 
walls, and creating a sense of privacy or intimacy. There is a four-
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factor test (under United States v. Dunn from 19871) that asks: (1) 
how close the claimed curtilage is to the home; (2) whether the 
area and the home share a common fence or barrier; (3) how the 
residents use the area; and (4) what steps the resident took to 
protect the area from observation by passersby.  
The protection of curtilage in a Fourth Amendment analysis 
has been reaffirmed in the 21st century, by Justice Scalia, who was 
a champion of protecting the curtilage of the home; his Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence will be missed. In Florida v. Jardines2 
in 2013, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that a trained 
dog, sniffing for marijuana scent outside a home but inside the 
fence, conducted an unauthorized search under the Fourth 
Amendment, because it violated the curtilage of the home. The 
fence and space defined by the homeowner were among the 
calculations that Justice Scalia made. 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Mr. Jardines had a reasonable expectation of privacy at his 
front door – but as many people in this audience know, the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test has had its ups and downs 
in appellate jurisprudence – a photograph from the air may not 
trigger reasonable expectations of privacy, but an infrared scanner 
to see the heat emissions within the house may. 
In fact, in the 2001 Kyllo decision (involving infrared scanners 
to see whether a homeowner was using marijuana grow lamps), 
Justice Scalia posited that one of the questions the Court used to 
determine whether the search was unreasonable was asking 
whether the device the government used was generally available to 
the public. When “the government uses a device that is not in 
general public use . . . [then it is] unreasonable without a warrant.” 
We would all agree that the devices the general public use 
today are very different than they were 15 years ago when Justice 
Scalia wrote those words. And, as technology has evolved over 
that time, the amount of data collected using that technology has 
increased exponentially. The Court will be hard-pressed to rely on 
																																								 																				
1 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
2 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
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its “general-population-using-the-technology” test to determine 
whether a search is unreasonable. As Chris Ayers pointed out, in 
South Carolina, the AMI smart meters installed by the public 
utility were able to identify individuals growing marijuana, 
reporting them to the police. There was no Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure because the investigation was not performed by 
the government. As we will discuss later, these indirect disclosures 
will increase with more private companies collecting more unique 
and detailed data. 
Furthermore, given all the sensors within the Internet of 
Things-enabled technologies that are designed to collect, store and 
transmit information, can we even have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy? This is particularly true if the ubiquity of the use itself is 
part of the reasonableness test. This tautological logic is 
frustrating. 
But then again, even if we do have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, with smart fridges and smart thermostats and other smart-
home devices, we are inviting someone into the house – and they 
never leave. In the seminal Fourth Amendment decision in Katz, 
Justice Stewart wrote that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
could extend to the inside of a public phone booth – but that was 
because Charles Katz – who was using the phone booth to make 
illegal bets all over the country – “knowingly [sought] to preserve 
[his conversations] as private.” 
Then again, who are we being secure from? The Fourth 
Amendment – and government access to data – is an important 
consideration, but the sharing between and among private 
companies also must be contemplated. 
Third Party Doctrine 
As I mentioned earlier, an additional constitutional standard 
could make protecting the curtilage increasingly difficult – the 
third-party doctrine. The third-party doctrine is a Supreme Court 
principle that holds that people who voluntarily give information to 
third parties—such as banks, phone companies, Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) and e-mail servers—have “no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.” Some legal theorists feel the third-party 
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doctrine was wrongly decided in the previous century, forty years 
ago in an analog world. That was back when you had to go to a 
bank to open an account. When the only “third party” involved in 
sharing photos with family and friends was a leather-bound album. 
Not so today. Given how interconnected and electronic our 
information and assets are today, there are few things – including 
all the devices we talked about this morning – that would not have 
some element of interaction with a third party. 
Justice Sotomayor recognized this, in her 2012 concurrence in 
United States v. Jones3, opining: that “[m]ore fundamentally, it 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill-suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.” 
These “mundane tasks” could include every aspect of home 
living – reading, cooking, movement within a home, using 
electricity throughout the home, and home security monitoring 
with alarm systems, cameras and sensors. Ironically, taking steps 
to increase our home and curtilage security may actually reduce 
our legal protection, since most of us will have to use a third-party 
system (like Sawyers Control Systems) to protect our homes. The 
call to re-evaluate the third-party doctrine by Justice Sotomayor is 
essential if we are to remain safe and secure – physically and under 
the law – in our 21st century homes and our curtilage. 
BIG DATA’S HOUSE 
Part of the conundrum of the IoT Home is that much of the 
activity that is being recorded, gathered and analyzed had 
previously taken place, but they had not been previously analyzed. 
Kids playing in the basement. Parents making dinner. Doing 
laundry. Yardwork. Sleeping. All activities that have occurred 
since homes were first built, but the data-ification of these 
activities – and the crunching of that data, on the individual and 
																																								 																				
3 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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aggregate levels – has only just begun. Previously, a single day, or 
event, would generally be fleeting, a passing moment that was not 
memorialized, unless it was a special event. This obscurity made 
us less aware of individual days, and more aware of unique events. 
With connected homes and ubiquitous sensors, every day is 
special, unique, categorized and memorialized. Professor Hartzog 
used the phrase “fixation of a moment designed to be fleeting” in 
another context – surveillance – but the concept is the same. These 
snapshots of data are fixations on moments, on processes. The 
ubiquity of these Internet-enabled devices (currently at 4.9 billion 
devices and increasing to 25 billion by 2020, according to Gartner) 
add layers of complexity and analysis on these mundane tasks 
previously undocumented. 
That analysis can be useful, effective, and improve not only the 
lives within the connected home but also having a societal impact. 
The sensors and the smart homes are looking for ways to save 
money, looking for patterns and ways to improve your quality of 
life along with non-obvious relationships. 
When I was at the Department of Homeland Security, we spent 
a lot of time looking for non-obvious relationships, patterns that 
appeared through the analysis of big data. Non-obvious 
relationships do not always appear, and therefore the collection and 
analysis of a great deal of information without demonstrating any 
rewards can be ineffective if not analyzing the right data. 
With that said, major benefits can be had from collecting and 
crunching lots of data. But, with any collection of data, even the 
seemingly benign, we have to ask questions that are usually a lot 
trickier to answer than it seems: “Who else gets the data?” “Is the 
data being shared with other parties?” You know you are sharing 
data with a first third party, Company X, only for Intended Purpose 
Y, but is that information being shared with Company Z, too? And 
if that data is being shared with other parties, what rights do those 
parties have to your individual and aggregated data? 
Obviously, under the third-party doctrine, you no longer have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to your data that has been shared 
with your first third party. However, you still have other 
expectations about that data, including keeping it safe and secure, 
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and using it only for the purposes intended. In this situation, the 
third-party doctrine may say that you no longer have a privacy 
interest in information about your own home, but human nature 
and consumer expectations would differ. 
Since the biggest threat to connected homes is the risk of 
secondary or unknown uses, we as purchasers of the devices and 
sensors need to understand what this all means for us and our 
homes. 
INTER-CONNECTED WORLDS 
Sensors are useful, helpful, maybe even crucial, but they also 
fundamentally shift how we interact with our surroundings. They 
enter with little, if any, real notice and choice, and then blend into 
the scenery: unobtrusive, silent and passive. Once they are woven 
into the fabric of our lives and homes (and sometimes literally 
woven into the fabric), it’s easy to forget they are there. 
We must pay close attention to this issue, before we lose 
control of our homes, hearts and welfare. We are monitoring, 
gauging, storing and sharing data about personal activities and 
processes; we are sharing elements of the curtilage with strangers 
in the cloud, online and in social networks. 
In this always-on world, the ecosystem is the crux, and the 
weakest link in that ecosystem is the vulnerability. The 
fragmentation in software ecosystems, and the need to have 
multiple systems and software inter-connections, leads to 
inconsistencies, vulnerabilities and opened networks, subject to 
unauthorized access. 
Transparency 
Mary Culnan and Paula Bruening have outlined a detailed 
theory on how transparency and choice can be effectuated in a 
sensored world where the ability to convey appropriate notice may 
be constrained. 
But such transparency and choice are not required; it is only a 
best practice, consistent with the fair information practice 
principles (“FIPPs”) set forth by the Federal Trade Commission 
and other enforcement agencies (as David Hoffman discussed 
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earlier). In fact, in one of the few laws that govern the collection of 
online personal information, under the California Online Privacy 
Protection Act (CalOPPA), an “online service” only requires a 
privacy policy for the collection of personal information, narrowly 
defined to include name, address, and phone number among other 
data elements. The sensors we are discussing today do not meet 
these legislative definitions. 
The devices we are considering today are not online services – 
they’re not asking us to enter our social security numbers – they 
are sensing, storing and collecting data without us lifting a finger. 
We are considering devices for which passive data collection is 
part of the appeal. And there is often no way to provide a checkbox 
to require the consumer to click “agree” before the data starts to be 
generated. As Paula Bruening discussed, moving to a transparency 
regime is important. But it also may be difficult. 
And that is part of the problem – smart homes and sensors are 
not governed by legislation; they do not fall into the sectorial 
approach to privacy that the U.S. has adopted. Instead, we are 
relying on FIPPs and best practices and reasonable expectations. 
These are all well-intended, but as discussed earlier with 
reasonable expectations, the scale can shift, and furthermore we 
have put a great burden on individual consumers to wade through 
systems, programs and choices. 
Choices 
A reasonable expectation of privacy, coupled with notice from 
the company and some “choice” associated with the data 
collection, is consistent with industry best practices, and the FIPPs. 
And even though there may be notice and choice in discrete 
instances, that choice is often illusory – it is impossible to use 
certain brands of connected televisions without agreeing to the 
collection and use of browsing and viewing information for 
targeted advertising, for example, and the choice is controlled at 
the individual device level rather than holistically. Professor 
Hartzog talked about focusing first on the technology, how it is 
designed, how it is supposed to be sharing the information. I think 
that is part of the process, but I think the portion of the IoT 
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analysis that is under-emphasized is the interconnectivity between 
the technologies and the choices. 
The Online Trust Alliance has established Internet of Things 
principles for companies developing IoT products. Among the 
principles are allowing sharing only with opt in, and allowing 
people to delete the collected information. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) highlighted notice and choice, data security 
and data minimization in its IoT guidance last year. These are 
important principles, but I worry about overloading consumers 
with choices for multiple devices (even at multiple points in time). 
And as much as I like my job, most lawyers who write privacy 
policies and consents for just-in-time notices are looking at this as 
a compliance exercise, not an educational one. 
The FTC recommends writing policies, notices and other 
consumer-facing documents at the reading level of an eighth 
grader. Who here has read a privacy policy recently? That must be 
one heck of an 8th grade teacher; hats off to her or him. 
The test I usually apply is: “Will my mother understand it?” 
My mom is a great person, clearly, since she raised [my brother 
Tom Callahan] and me as well as our five other siblings. She also 
only has a high school degree, and is 82 years old. She can operate 
her iPhone, and can do some stuff on her computer, but for 
anything else, Tom’s business partner and our brother Pat has to 
remote into her computer in order to accomplish what Mom is 
trying to do. (That is a whole different type of connected home). 
So using her as a baseline is helpful to think about whether 
consumers are understanding the choices put in front of them. 
One way choice can be provided is by these “just-in-time” 
notices and choices. The notices appear at the time you want to 
engage or data is going to be collected. It is one thing to provide 
notice via a cell phone map or application, but how does just-in-
time notice work for sensors and other devices that are not directly 
interacting with you but still collecting data? And, with the growth 
of sensors and the ubiquity of the devices, providing any just-in-
time notices or choices could overwhelm a person. 
Another deficiency in a choice model for IoT devices in that 
choice is often thought of at the individual device level, when in 
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reality, it is the interconnectivity and the entire system that should 
be considered. These patchwork, fragmented software systems 
impede our ability to make knowing choices. 
Privacy by Design 
Paula Bruening earlier discussed Privacy by Design. The 
concept of Privacy by Design is an important element of the 
development of any device, much less one that is connected to 
your life, and your home. Privacy by Design is an approach that 
takes privacy into account throughout the whole engineering and 
lifecycle of a product. Privacy by Design can and should be 
incorporated proactively into Internet-enabled devices. With that 
said, the individual devices need to work together in an ecosystem 
in order to provide effective Privacy by Design. Once the process 
starts, including the addition of new devices and sensors, 
consumers have no idea how they will connect and what data they 
will share. The problem of the weakest link can undermine an 
ecosystem of devices that individually incorporated Privacy by 
Design, but did not consider the interconnections. 
IOT SECURITY 
Finally, I get to speak about the elephant in the room, or in the 
IoT devices – security. There are two aspects of security that are 
important for the connected home: 1) government access to IoT 
data; and 2) inherent security flaws in the devices, or in the device 
ecosystems that create vulnerabilities. 
Government Access to Data 
In addition to the struggle with connected devices and 
understanding the choice paradigm, the security of the sensors and 
their data – particularly those we use in the home – can raise 
alarms. Networked sensors are willing mechanisms for 
surveillance. That is what the devices are designed to do. 
Recently, a policy debate has emerged about whether using 
strong encryption for communications and data storage would 
hinder important law enforcement investigations. The term used 
most frequently among law enforcement is “going dark” – unable 
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to see vital communications. The current debate between Apple 
and the FBI with regard to the San Bernardino attacks has been 
discussed at length this morning so I will not discuss it. With 
regard to the question of whether the government is losing access 
to certain information, there’s a whole other universe of data that is 
not dark at all – IoT data. As Harvard’s Berkman Center’s 
Cybersecurity Project recently pointed out, the Internet of Things 
allows insights into aspects of society that previously were not ever 
monitored or stored. 
Just as we are creating and collecting exponentially more data 
due to these connected devices, so too does the government have 
the ability to gain legal access to that information. And of course, 
under the third-party doctrine, individuals do not have a privacy 
interest in that data they self-generated and volunteered to third 
parties. The amount of data generated each day demonstrates that 
law enforcement is not going dark, but instead shining a different 
color light. As we collect, store and analyze information within our 
home, we are undermining the protection of the curtilage, and 
could be allowing law enforcement to gain access to our data – and 
to look for obvious or non-obvious relationships in a way they 
could not have absent the ubiquity of data collected in our homes. 
Just last week, as part of his annual unclassified Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community testimony 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the 15 
intelligence agencies under his purview are increasingly looking to 
Internet-enabled devices for surveillance opportunities. “In the 
future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification, 
surveillance, monitoring, location tracking and targeting for 
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.” 
The risk is real. The interest from law enforcement and 
intelligence (and of course nefarious bad actors) is high. 
And remember, one of the tests for reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment is whether the device the government used is 
also used by the general public. The more devices we have 
monitoring our actions, the narrower that test becomes. 
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Security Flaws 
We have already discussed the patchwork, fragmented software 
systems. We often do not wholly understand what the devices are 
doing, but we understand that we need to keep the ports open in 
order to transmit the data. The security defaults on devices are 
frequently lax, or designed for open communications. 
Shodan, the self-styled “search engine for the Internet of 
Things” is a stark example of how many Internet-enabled devices 
are discoverable and searchable. That includes, by the way, traffic 
lights and industrial control systems, along with webcams and 
home routers. 
Of course, Shodan now markets itself partly as a vehicle to 
monitor network security, and to discover your own Internet-
enabled devices, but in reality, the search engine facilitates our 
most prurient interests, allowing us to step past the curtilage of 
other homes, as we sit in the relative security of our own. 
Just as making choices at a granular level for each of the 
connected devices blurs the overarching question about controlling 
one’s own information, so too does relying on each connected 
device to keep your information secure, and to keep the 
connections between each device secure. 
The impact of not having good security in a smart home could 
mean the home itself turns against you. Ransomware – a hacker 
taking control of a computer or Internet-enabled device, and 
holding it hostage until you pay a ransom to unlock it – has been a 
common problem over the past few years for personal computers 
and other unprotected devices. There have been apocryphal stories 
of hackers taking over your house via refrigerator. But that actually 
may not be too farfetched. The security of a connected home is 
only as secure as the weakest device, the device with the worst 
security. As we add more sensors, devices and computers into our 
homes, we introduce many more potential “weakest links.” 
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
What I worry about is that our homes may become an Internet-
enabled tragedy of the commons. As you all likely know, the 
tragedy of the commons is a situation where individuals acting 
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independently and rationally according to their own self-interest 
behave contrary to the best interests of the whole by depleting 
some common resource. We most frequently heard about this 
principle in law school with sheep and cows grazing on common 
lands in pre-Victorian England. But this principle may be ready for 
a refresh. 
It is strange to think of our homes as “common” territory, even 
with the third-party doctrine. We keep our home safe and secure, 
we lock it, we establish the curtilage that helps define the 
boundaries of our home. How could this be a common area? 
The commons that the devices are using (for their own self 
interest) are our homes themselves. Yes, they use bandwidth and 
they use electricity, but I am not talking about the physical drain 
on your home. Instead, I am talking about how the devices, sensors 
and computers documenting each of our movements, steps and 
activities may actually be depleting the common resource – the 
sanctity of our home itself. 
The sensors we have installed are recording, documenting and 
itemizing our lives. 
But by doing so, we expose ourselves to third parties with 
whom we have contracted (and thus diminish our privacy interest 
in the information in the first place). 
We expose ourselves to other third parties we don’t know 
about, maybe there by invitation, and maybe there by deceit. 
We expose ourselves by relying on the security of the devices, 
and how they interconnect. 
We expose ourselves because we may not be able to 
comprehend the sheer amount of information coming from the 
devices. 
Our minds, and our homes, are the commons. We have finite 
resources to understand, manage and take action, but we have 
potentially infinite metrics to gauge. 
How do we solve this? As Justice Sotomayor noted in U.S. v. 
Jones4, allowing the third-party doctrine to continue in the 21st 
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century “is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.” A review and recalibration 
of the third-party doctrine is an important step for protecting our 
homes, and our curtilages, even as we collect and store more data 
within the home. 
With that said, although I mentioned legislation earlier, I do not 
think it would be useful to create legislation to govern IoT. 
Legislation is often reactive, and cannot anticipate all uses or 
developments. And just thinking about Congress trying to define 
IoT gives me a headache. 
I think self-regulation can help to a certain extent. Companies 
agreeing to baseline principles can be a good thing in this 
environment, for the companies and consumers alike, and I think 
having some agreed-upon baseline standards will be important for 
the growth of the industry, and for the protection of our own 
homes. As I stated earlier, the ecosystem is the crux, and the 
weakest link in that ecosystem is the vulnerability. 
We need to take steps to protect our curtilage – physical or 
digital – from unwelcome observers. We can use systems and 
software and end-to-end encryption to secure our home, but we 
need to feel comfortable with these steps taken. Think about 
security, consider end-to-end encryption and other active steps to 
re-take our curtilage. 
I started this talk asking why do we expect more privacy in our 
homes, and is that expectation sustainable in a sensor-laden world. 
The answer on why we expect more privacy in our homes – in 
addition to the legal discussion – is an emotional one. Because it is 
emotional, it also means that, regardless of legal jargon, the desire 
to keep safe and secure in one’s home will continue, even in this 
sensor-laden world. In fact, maybe because of the sensors, we will 
work to protect our curtilage even more effectively. Think about 
our connected homes as the lifecycle of not just data, but of living. 
 
